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The recent burst of violence linked with the Saudi-born
Islamic militant, Usama Bin Laden, sheds some light on a
recent evolution of Islamic radicalism. In the eighties,
most of the violence was linked either to an internal
confrontation between a state and its Islamist opposi-
tion (Syria, Egypt, Afghanistan, and later Algeria) or to a
state-sponsored terrorism with strategic goals: for
instance, the attacks against US and French barracks in
Lebanon in 1983-4 and the hostage-takings of 1985
were aimed at ending the Western support for Iraq in
the war with Iran. In the nineties, the internal violence
either decreased or is no longer threatening the state
apparatus. It is rather being directed at Ôside-targetsÕ
(like tourists in Egypt, former fellow-Islamists, or the
civilian population in Algeria). 
The Radicalization of 
Sunni Conservative
F u n d a m e n t a l i s m
Most of the main-stream Islamist move-
ments endeavoured, more or less successfully,
to enter the legal political scene (Turkey, Jor-
dan, Yemen, Kuwait, Egypt) and largely gave
up their supra-national agenda in favour of a
national posture (Refah, FIS), if not nationalist
(Palestinian Hamas, but also É Islamic Iran).
But this normalization of the Islamist move-
ments left aside a new kind of radical fringe.
The bombing of the World Trade Centre in
New York (1993) was probably the harbinger
of new patterns of radical Islamist violence.
The targets are symbolic Western (and more
precisely American) buildings or people. There
is no longer any strategic goal; more precisely,
there is a huge discrepancy between the
avowed goals (the departures of Western
forces from the Gulf) and the real threat they
represent for the Western interests. The in-
volved networks are made of transnational
militants, who often have multiple citizenship
(or no citizenship at all, like Bin Laden), and do
not link their fight with a precise state or
nation. Even if they come from some main-
stream Islamist movements (like the Muslim
Brothers) they do not identify themselves with
the present strategy of these movements.
They appeal to uprooted transnational mili-
tants who travel from one jihad to the other,
and identify themselves with a sort of imagi-
nary u m m a h.
Almost all of these militants shared a com-
mon point: they spent some time in Afghanis-
tan, in Mujahidin training camps, and they are
based between Lahore (Pakistan) and Kanda-
har (Afghanistan). This Afghan connection
dates back to the early eighties. In response to
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a joint ven-
ture of Pakistani military services (ISI) and
Saudi Intelligence (under Prince Turki Bin
Faysal), with the support of the CIA, endeav-
oured to send to Afghanistan a kind of ÔIslamic
legionÕ to help the Afghan Mujahidin. The
sponsors had different agendas. The Saudis
and the Americans wanted to Ôbleed the Sovi-
etsÕ and to defuse the growing anti-Western
Islamic radicalism by diverting it against com-
munism (especially after the 1983-4 events in
Lebanon). The Saudis were also trying to
enforce their Islamic credentials against the
Iranian brand of Islamism, by fostering a strict
Sunni militant Islam. The Pakistanis had a
more long-term strategic agenda. They were
the only ones who thought in terms of a post-
Soviet era. They wanted to establish a kind of
protectorate on Afghanistan through funda-
mentalist and ethnically Pashtun movements
(this dual ethnic and religious connection has
been a permanent feature of the Pakistani pol-
icy, even when they shifted their support from
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar to the Taliban in 1994).
The purveyors of these networks were main-
ly Arab Muslim brothers, like Abdallah Azzam.
A Palestinian holding a Jordanian passport, he
headed the Peshawar office of the ÔMektab ul
KhedamatÕ, which worked as the dispatcher of
the volunteers flocking from the Muslim
world. (Azzam was assassinated in September
1989.) Many militants from repressed radical
movements found their way to Afghanistan,
among them many Egyptian leaders: Shawki
Islambuli, the brother of SadatÕs killer; Sheikh
Omar Abdurrahman; Talacat Fuad Qassim;
Mustafa Hamza; Abou Hamza of the Gamaca t ;
Al Zawahiri of the Jihad (who co-signed most
of Bin LadenÕs communiqus in early 1998);
and others. The fact that Sheikh Abdurrahman
easily obtained a US visa from the American
consulate in Khartoum, followed by a green
card in 1992, is certainly a legacy of this peri-
o d .
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan
(1989), followed by the collapse of the USSR
(1991), changed the picture. The USA lost
interest in these militant networks, but for dif-
ferent reasons the Saudis and Pakistanis still
supported them. A turning point was the Gulf
War of 1991: suddenly the ÔAfghansÕ, as they
were called, founded a new jihad, this time
against the West.
Many militants, back in their country of ori-
gin, founded or joined radical groups, some of
them being splinter groups from the main-
stream Islamist movements. The GIA in Algeria
was founded by ÔAfghansÕ (Tayyeb el Afghani,
Jaffar al Afghani, and Sharif al Gusmi), while
the pro-GIA journal in London, al Ansar w a s
headed by Abu Hamza, an Egyptian who was
severely wounded in Afghanistan. The Kash-
miri radical movement Harakat al Ansar was
also founded by former ÔAfghansÕ, as was the
Yemenite Jihad, founded by Sheikh Tariq al
Fadil, involved in a bloody hostage-taking of
Western tourists in December 1998. By the
same token, the head of the group held
responsible for the attack on a group of
tourists in Luxor (November 1997), Mehat
Mohammed Abdel Rahman, has also travelled
to Afghanistan. In the Philippines, Abu Baker
Jenjalani, head of the Abu Sayyaf group (killed
in 1998), also has an Afghan background
(although he is one of the few to have been
supported by Libya).
But other militants did not come back to
their own country. They used to travel from
one place to the other, fighting a nomadic
jihad against the West. A group headed by
Sheikh Omar Abdurrahman and Yussuf Ramzi
tried to blow up the World Trade Centre in
New York in 1993; both were in Afghanistan
and the latter fled to Pakistan after the action.
The last operation was the bombing of two US
embassies in Eastern Africa. The main suspect,
Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, is a Palestinian who
was trained also in Afghanistan.
All these militants and networks have kept
their ÔAfghanÕ connections: Usama Bin Laden
is living in Afghanistan under the protection
of the Taliban. They are also supported in Pak-
istan by a cluster of political and religious
organizations, loosely coordinated in the
framework of the Dawat ul Irshad, established
near Lahore. One finds the Islamist Jamaca t - i
Islami, the more conservative Jamiat-Ulama
Islami, which controlled the networks of
madrasas from which the Taliban movement
originated, and more radical splinter groups
like the Sepah-i Saheban, whose main goal is
to fight Shicism. Some high-level former Pak-
istani officials, like the general Hamid Gul, for-
mer Head of the ISI at the end of the Afghan
War, are also supporting the movement (Gul
protested against the extradition of Ramzi to
the USA and the bombings by the US forces of
the Mujahidin training camps in August 1998).
These groups, which were all involved in sup-
porting the Afghan Mujahidin, have openly
turned anti-Western, in phase with a huge part
of the Pakistani intelligentsia. If the Pakistani
government takes its distance from Bin Laden,
it openly supports the Taliban movement.
How can one assess the importance of this
radical movement? It is not solely a rear-guard
fighting waged by Ôlost soldiersÕ. On one hand,
it is one of the consequences of the policy of
conservative re-Islamization waged by states
like Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (but also Egypt),
and is in phase with the entry into the labour
market of thousands of madrasa students. It is
also a consequence of the integration of the
mainstream Islamist movements into the
domestic political scene, which left out mili-
tants with no state or nation. It is not a coinci-
dence if many of these militants are uprooted
Palestinian refugees, or come from the periph-
ery of the Middle East (with the notable excep-
tion of Egypt). They are not involved in the
main Middle Eastern conflict, like Palestine,
because the struggle is waged by a well-root-
ed ÔIslamo-nationalistÕ movement like the
Hamas. All the militant actors strongly advo-
cate supra-nationalism and practise it. The Tal-
iban even downgraded the ÔIslamic State of
AfghanistanÕ to a ÔmereÕ ÔEmirateÕ. In Usama
Bin LadenÕs networks (the Al Qaida Move-
ment) there are Egyptians, Pakistanis,
Sudanese, and Palestinians. Many of the mili-
tants, by the way, are really uprooted. They
once fought in ÔperipheralÕ jihads, like Bosnia,
Kashmir, or Afghanistan, where their relations
with the local population remain uneasy. Abu
Hamza is an Egyptian, acting for the Algerian
GIA in London, whose son-in-law (who has a
British passport) was arrested in Yemen
(December 1998). Yussuf Ramzi, born in
Kuwait to Palestinian and Pakistani parents,
went to the Philippines and to the USA. In fact,
the militants are a pure product of globaliza-
tion and the New World Order Ð using dollars,
English, cellular phones, the internet, and liv-
ing in camps or hotels.
Their second characteristic is that their ide-
ology links a very conservative traditional
Islam (shariat and only the shariat) with vio-
lence and terrorism. In particular, they are very
a n t i - S h icite. Although their anti-shicism is well
rooted in traditional Sunni fundamentalism, it
has been catapulted by the Wahhabi influ-
e n c e .1 These neo-fundamentalist radicals are
rather different from the mainstream Islamist
movements, not only in terms of politics but
also of ideology. The Islamists, although advo-
cating the implementation of the shariat, have
a social and economic programme, coupled
with a political agenda; they claim also to
bypass the shica-sunni divide, to promote
women in an Islamic society, and to not con-
fuse Christianism and Western imperialism
(Hassan al Banna was eager to establish a rela-
tionship with the Copts; Lebanese Hezbullah
and the Iranian Islamist governments have
also been eager to keep some connections
with Christian groups). The conservative back-
ground of the neo-fundamentalists is by con-
trast clearly expressed by their insistence on
the mere implementation of the shariat in
order to create an Islamic society, on the con-
finement of women, and on hostility against
the Shicites (branded heresy),2 the Jews and
the Christians. This hostility is heralded in the
name of Bin LadenÕs movement ÔWorld Islamic
Front for the struggle against Christians and
J e w s Õ .
Nevertheless, the main weakness of these
movements is precisely their lack of con-
stituency among the large Muslim countries
(except Pakistan). '
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1. Interestingly enough, the Wahhabi influence had
less impact on an other ÔheresyÕ: sufism. If Sufi
practices have decreased, many of these
fundamentalists, like the Taliban do acknowledge
their Sufi background and did not indulge in
destroying tombs of the ÔSaintsÕ.
2. This anti-Shicas bias is well expressed in a book
written by Maulana Nomani, a Pakistani deobandi,
Khomeyni, Iranian revolution and the Shica faith,
with an introduction by the Indian Muslim salafi
Sayyed Nadwi, denouncing the Iranian Revolution.
Dharb-ul Mu'min, a journal close to the Taliban and
published in Karachi, has published some khotbas
of Sheikh Hudaybi, imam of the Masjid-e Nabavi,
who severely criticizes Christians, Jews and Shica s ,
called k u f f a r (unbelievers), r a f a w i z (heretics) and
m o n a f i q i n (hypocrites). (August 2 1998, on the
Website Taliban.com).
